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Credible Purchases of Credibility through 
Exchange Rate Pegging
An Optimal Taxation Framework
BERTHOLD HERRENDORF 




We consider the time consistency problem of monetary policy in an open 
economy when inflation is in part uncontrollable due to stochastic distur­
bances. If these disturbances are private information of the government, 
individuals cannot discover whether the government is responsible for re­
alized inflation surprises. As is standard this leads to an inflationary bias 
in a reputational equilibrium when inflation is targeted. We show that 
pegging the exchange rate eliminates this bias if the foreign authority is 
precommited. However, since generally the foreign inflation rate is domes­
tically suboptimal, only a properly designed crawling peg is guaranteed 
of improving welfare.
KEYWORDS: Asymmetric Information; Credibility; Exchange Rate Peg­
ging; Optimal Inflation Taxes; Time Consistency.
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One important feature of a pegged nominal exchange rate regime is its disinfla­
tionary potential, given that one country in the system has achieved relatively 
stable prices. This has been widely recognized in the literature, which was 
mostly focused on the European experience. A  first formalization of the disin­
flation properties of the EMS was offered by Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), who 
essentially applied an idea o f Rogoff (1985) to a two country world. Within 
a closed economy Rogoff suggested the employment of a conservative central 
banker, who is overly averse to inflation, in order to eliminate the inflation­
ary bias of the discretionary equilibrium, arising when the monetary authority 
does not have access to a precommitment technology. Obviously this solution 
is only applicable when the central banker enjoys enough institutional indepen­
dence from the government to actually run the central bank according to his 
preferences.1 In contrast when he is dependent on the government, Giavazzi 
and Pagano (1988) suggest that a conservative central banker can indirectly 
be employed by setting up a fixed exchange rate system with a foreign country 
that has managed to eliminate its discretionary inflation bias, for example, like 
Germany by itself having established an independent central bank.
This argument has frequently been used to explain the disinflation pro­
cess that some of the EMS-participants have experienced.2 However, as re­
alignments are still possible, the EMS is not a fixed but rather a pegged nom­
inal exchange rate regime.3 While irrevocably fixed nominal exchange rates 
are credible per definition, the credibility of a pegged nominal exchange rate 
system needs to be justified endogenously.4 As is familiar from the literature 
on time consistency, a nominal exchange rate peg will be called credible if the 
decision to follow the pegged system is found to be time consistent.
The credibility issue of pegged exchange rate regimes has not been ad-
1 An institutional reform that achieves sufficient central bank independence may be rather 
difficult to pass through the legislative system and is therefore not discussed here.
2See for example Currie, Levine and Perlman (1992).
3 A pegged nominal exchange rate system can be either a fixed peg or a crawling peg, 
depending on whether the ex ante announced rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation is 
equal to zero. The difference between a pegged and a fixed exchange rate systems is that the 
former is adjustable.
4Irrevocably fixed exchange rates arise, for example, when a country’s fixed exchange vis- 
a-vis a center country’s currency is written into its constitution. An historical example is 




























































































equately addressed analytically in the literature on exchange rate systems. 
Common practice is either to assume credibility or to offer some ad-hoc expla­
nations for it.5 For example, it has frequently been argued that the credibility 
of the EMS stems from the credibility of the participants’ commitment to the 
eventual economic and monetary integration implied by the process towards 
European Union. The commitment was considered to be credible because of 
“wider European political objectives” , which led to substantial changes in the 
participating countries’ policy stances [Goodhart (1990)]. The fact that no 
realignment had occurred between January 1987 and August 1992 seemed to 
support this view.6 However, when the uncertainty regarding the ratification of 
the Maastricht Treaty surfaced and the ERM experienced a dramatic crisis in 
September 1992, considerable doubt regarding the prospect for monetary inte­
gration in Europe arose.7 Alternatively, the loss of an international reputation 
as a consequence o f reneging on a pegged exchange rate may lead to a reduced 
incentive to cooperate with the reneging authority in the future, perhaps in 
other areas than exchange rate management. Some authors, including Obstfeld 
(1991) and Rasmussen (1993), have therefore assumed a fixed exogenous cost 
of reneging on an exchange rate announcement, which may be avoided through 
reneging on a domestic target.8
These arguments, while intuitively appealing, are essentially ad hoc in 
nature and few formal attempts to model reputation in order to explain the 
credibility of an exchange rate regime have been made.9 However, while repu­
tational forces may explain why it is optimal for policy makers to do without 
unexpected devaluations, a sound theoretical explanation as to why pegging 
the exchange rate should in any sense be preferable to targeting the inflation 
rate has not yet been offered. Usually this issue is avoided. For example, 
de Kock and Grilli (1993) (implicitly) assume that the policy of targeting the 
ex ante optimal domestic inflation rate is not credible and leads to the discre­
tionary equilibrium with the inherent inflationary bias while they show that a 
fixed peg o f the domestic currency to a foreign currency is credible when the 
foreign policy maker is precommited. In addition to being ad hoc, this way
5See for instance Currie et al. (1992).
6Compare for example Begg and Wyplosz (1992) or Eichengreen (1993).
7See Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) or Svensson (1994) for a more detailed discussion.
sNote that it might be questioned whether a policy maker who sticks to his promises given 
to other countries’ policy makers but cheats his private sector will be considered as being 
credible by other policy makers.




























































































o f proceeding is logically inconsistent, because within the standard monetary 
policy game, pegging the nominal exchange rate and thereby importing the 
foreign inflation rate is analytically equivalent to targeting the foreign infla­
tion rate. Moreover nominal exchange rate pegging should in general be even 
welfare inferior to inflation targeting in this context, because the latter op­
tion allows one to choose the domestically optimal inflation rate instead of just 
importing the foreign inflation rate. To clarify these issues, the focus of this 
paper lies in addressing the question: Why may exchange rate targets be more 
credible than inflation targets?10
Three aspects of this question appear to be of particular importance. 
First the nominal exchange rate is the price of the foreign currency in terms of 
the domestic currency as determined in the (single) foreign exchange market. 
In contrast the inflation rate is an artifact derived from many markets, which 
relies on the use of price indices and may be prone to measurement errors. 
Secondly, the nominal exchange rate is continuously observable whereas the 
inflation rate is observed discretely (at best monthly) and with a lag.11 Finally, 
a chosen value for the nominal exchange rate target that is consistent with the 
economic fundamentals can in principle be perfectly achieved when the pegging 
country completely gives up control over its money supply. Of course, it must 
also have sufficient international reserves or perfect access to the international 
credit markets, implying that it can defend its exchange rate target whenever 
necessary.12 On the contrary, an inflation target is in reality not perfectly 
achievable due to uncontrollable factors influencing the money supply, to the 
instability o f money demand, and to the uncertain time lag with which changes 
in base money are transmitted to inflation changes.13
10The importance of this question is widely recognized in the literature. Compare, for 
example, Begg and Wyplosz (1987), Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989), Blackburn and Sola 
(1993), and Edwards (1993).
11 Within a closed economy setting, the consequences of this lag on reputation were consid­
ered in Grossman and Van Huyck (1986) and Miller and Salmon (1989).
12Problems related to potential speculative attacks on the pegged exchange rate regime 
are therefore assumed away. For a recent review of the literature on speculative attacks see 
Blackburn and Sola (1993).
13Note that the nominal exchange rates of the stable EMS currencies were allowed to 
fluctuate within ±2.5% bands around the central parity. Since the deviations of actual 
inflation from the targeted values are by far larger in reality, this is not at odds with the 
admittedly idealized assumption of the perfect exchange rate controllability. As an example, 
take the German Bundesbank in the 1980s: It announced corridors for its monetary targets 
with differences of at least two percent between the lower bound, B1, and the upper bound, 
Bu. Provided that the target value was the average between Bl and B“ , the most precise 




























































































While these differences indicate potential advantages of nominal exchange 
rate targeting, the last is of particular importance and shall be elaborated on 
in the following analysis. To work with the simplest framework possible, it is 
assumed that the inflation rate is subject to unexpected, exogenous stochastic 
disturbances, which may for example be thought o f as velocity shocks to money 
demand. Consequently the domestic authority can only incompletely achieve 
its inflation target. Following Canzoneri (1985), it is then argued that since the 
authority’s inflation target is its private information, individuals do not know 
with certainty whether ex post deviations from their expected inflation rate 
are due to unexpected disturbances or due to cheating on part of the author­
ity, which presumably benefits from inflation surprises. Large velocity shocks 
therefore lead to a loss of the policy maker’s reputation and to an inflationary 
bias, although it is optimal not to renege in a reputational equilibrium.14
It is shown below that this inflationary bias from asymmetric informa­
tion can be eliminated when the nominal exchange rate is targeted, given that 
the exchange rate target is in principle perfectly achievable. In particular, 
unexpected velocity shocks lead to offsetting changes in international reserves 
while the nominal exchange rate remains unchanged. Consequently, even un­
der asymmetric information, there is no uncertainty about whether the policy 
maker has reneged on a preannounced pegged nominal exchange rate and a 
loss of reputation only results when he actually does so.15
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows: In section 2, the basic 
model and the optimal tax problem are described. Section 3 discusses the 
outcome of the monetary policy game between the authority and the private 
sector when the inflation rate is targeted and the nominal exchange rate floats. 
In particular, in the subsections 3.1 and 3.2, the time consistent solutions under 
precommitment and discretion are derived. Moreover, the possible realization 
of the precommitment solution as a reputational equilibrium is discussed under 
symmetric and asymmetric information. In section 4, the welfare gains from 
exchange rate targeting under asymmetric information are studied and section
corresponded to a ±20% potential deviation of the actual realization from the target. It 
may be noted that the Bundesbank even missed its target corridors frequently in the 1980s 
[Compare the annual reports of the Bundesbank].
14 As Canzoneri (1985) argued, publishing the inflation target would not solve the problem, 
since the authority had an incentive to misrepresent it.
15The crucial role of asymmetric information in explaining the difference between exchange 
rate and inflation targets has already been noticed by Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989, p. 103), 




























































































5 offers some conclusions.
2 The Model
In this section the open economy optimal tax model of de Kock and Grilli 
(1993) is modified so as to highlight the role o f asymmetric information about 
stochastic disturbances affecting the inflation rate. We consider a world o f 
two open economies, referred to as the domestic and the foreign country. In 
both o f them a homogeneous output good is exogenously given and prices are 
perfectly flexible. The domestic and the foreign output good are supposed to 
be perfect substitutes and it is assumed that there are no barriers to trade. 
Hence purchasing power parity holds:
(1)
In equation (1), e< denotes the nominal exchange rate from the perspective o f 
the domestic country, i.e. the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic 
currency and Pt is the domestic price level. A star indicates a foreign variable. 
As a consequence of purchasing power parity, the rate of nominal exchange 
rate depreciation equals the difference between the domestic and the foreign 




n ,-n 1> ( 2)
where I I ^  :=  A P t(t)/Pt{l\.
The only difference between the domestic and the foreign country in our 
model is that the foreign country is assumed to have established a completely 
independent central bank, whose constitutional goal is price stability. This 
extreme form of Rogoff’s (1985) conservative central banker implies the possi­
bility to precommit and hence the absence of a time consistency problem in the 
foreign country [Neumann (1991)].16 In contrast to the foreign central banker,
16Compare Walsh (1993) for recent review of the role of central bank independence. Of 
course, even the “almost independent” central banks in the real world do not usually satisfy 
all of the necessary and sufficient criteria for complete central bank independence. The 
German Bundesbank, for instance, has no exchange rate sovereignty, which is rather given 




























































































the domestic monetary authority is assumed to be completely dependent on the 
government.17 Consequently RogofF’s (1985) suggestion o f employing a conser­
vative domestic central banker is not applicable, because the central banker’s 
decisions will merely reflect the preferences of the government. Note that the 
asymmetry resulting from the different institutional status o f the domestic and 
the foreign central bank may well be a good approximation o f the reality of 
the EMS, at least after 1987.18
Domestic inflation policy is described by a highly stylized public finance 
model o f optimal taxation. The domestic authority needs to raise revenues to 
finance the present value of an exogenously given, known stream o f expenditure 
and to repay the debt inherited from the last period’s government. Revenues 
can be collected through both, output taxation and seigniorage, that is, the 
proceeds from the creation of money. In addition, the policy maker may also 
issue bonds to shift expenditure between periods. For simplicity, these bonds 
are taken to be indexed to ex post inflation. If Q denotes the present value 
in period 0 o f the sum of all future government expenditure relative to GNP, 
Tf the average output tax rate in period t, seigniorage relative to GNP in 
period t, and r the constant and exogenous real interest rate, the government 
budget constraint in real values may be expressed as:
°° 1
»  =  E ( r n f ( ' . + > . ) -  (3)
Reflecting common practice in the real world, output taxes are assumed to be 
collected with a one period lag. More precisely, in period f +  1, the government 
is supposed to collect tax receipts of (1 +  r)r< so that the period t value o f that 
period’s tax proceeds relative to GNP is r<. Note that since we have assumed 
output taxes to be fully indexed to inflation, any sort of Olivera Tanzi-effect is 
absent. The reason for incorporating the collection lag here is rather a technical 
one as will become apparent in 3.3.3 below.
rate constraints on German monetary policy in the 1980s and finds evidence that, at least ex 
post, an inflationary bias resulted. In a more realistic setting than the one described here, 
it would therefore only be assumed that the degree of foreign central bank independence is 
higher than in the domestic country. However, all arguments would remain the same.
17We synonymously refer to the entity of them as the authority or the policy maker.
18Essentially, the Bundesbank appears to have aimed for price stability while the other 
EMS members took the German inflation rate as given and defended their exchange rate 
parities. Compare Giavazzi and Giovannini (1987), Biltoft and Boersch (1992), and Herz and 




























































































Since all public debt is indexed to ex-post inflation, seigniorage can only 
be collected from the devaluation of nominal balances as a consequence of antic­
ipated and surprise inflation. To specify the seigniorage revenues, individuals 
are supposed to be forward looking, to have rational expectations, and a de­
mand for nominal balances that depends negatively on the expected inflation 
rate. Following de Kock and Grilli (1993), we may then represent seigniorage 
by a first order approximation,
=  oc(Ut -  nj) +  a /m ?, (4)
where Ilf is the inflation expectation o f individuals at the end of period t — 1, 
i.e. Ilf =  £ (_ i (Ilt). The constants a and 0 are assumed to be positive, because 
an increase of either expected or unexpected inflation is supposed to generate 
additional seigniorage.19 In addition, /} is supposed to be smaller than one, 
because the demand for nominal balances is assumed to be elastic with respect 
to expected inflation, reflecting that private agents will reduce their nominal 
balances when they expect higher inflation rates. In contrast, unexpected 
inflation is a revenue instrument with an inelastic revenue tax base and thus 
results in higher marginal revenues than expected inflation.
The substitution of (4) into (3) yields an intertemporal budget constraint 
in terms of the tax rate and the inflation rate:
00 1
S =  E  h  + Q(IIi "  n?) +  apn*} • (5)
Both output taxation and inflation are assumed to result in social loss. The 
social loss from output taxation occurs as a consequence of, amongst others, 
collection costs while the social loss from inflation comes from suboptimal 
holdings o f nominal balances (due to expected inflation) and from menu costs 
(due to expected and unexpected inflation), which arise from the administrative 
costs of posting new prices and of adjusting the tax system to be fully indexed 
to inflation.20 As is standard, we use an additively separable and quadratic 
representation o f the social loss in any period t. The present discounted
19We implicitly assume that the optimal inflation rate lies on the left side of the seigniorage 
Laffer curve. This would result endogenously in a more general model in which seigniorage 
depends concavely on inflation; see Herrendorf (1994c), where I also discuss in more detail 
the seigniorage collected from the devaluation of nominal government debt through inflation 
surprises.




























































































value of current and future period-by-period social loss then is:
L = ES (!+*)* f (n 2 + cn(2), (6)
where S denotes the policy maker’s discount rate and c is the weight attached 
to the losses from inflation relative to the losses from output taxation. We will 
also need to impose a condition of the form
(1 +  S) <  (1 +  r )2 (7)
on the discount rate. The reason for (7) will become obvious later when the 
optimal policy is determined.
Since we want to study the role of asymmetric information, we introduce 
uncertainty by assuming that the inflation rate Ft( is only controllable up to a 
stochastic disturbance £(. This may, for instance, be justified by aggregation 
problems, measurement errors, money supply shocks, or velocity shocks.21 If 
7T( denotes the inflation target of the policy maker, we may thus express the 
actual inflation rate as the sum of his inflation target and a disturbance e<, 
which is supposed to have zero mean and a finite variance <x2,22
n t — 7rt +  et . (8)
Two different scenarios are to be distinguished now: The symmetric informa­
tion case, in which both, the private sector and the policy maker know the 
realizations of the disturbance ex post, and the asymmetric information case, 
in which the realizations of the disturbance are only known to the policy maker 
ex post. The policy maker can compute the realization of e( in either case be­
cause he always knows his target 7r<. The private sector, on the contrary, can 
only figure out the realization of the disturbance in the symmetric information 
case, in which it knows the policy maker’s inflation target. In contrast, in 
the asymmetric information case, the target is the authority’s private informa­
tion and the private sector is supposed to know only the distribution of the
21 See Herrendorf (1994b) for a set-up that explicitly accounts for these effects. Similar 
assumptions were also made by Basar and Salmon (1990), Canzoneri (1985), or Cukierman 
and Meltzer (1986a,b).
22 Note that this reduced form for inflation could be justified by explicitly modeling the 
money market equilibrium as in Canzoneri (1985), which, however, would not add much 





























































































Independent of the information assumptions, the domestic authority’s 
optimal taxation problem is to find a sequence of tax rates {r<} and infla­
tion targets {7r<} that minimizes the expected social loss (6) subject to the 
intertemporal budget constraint (5). In order to implement the optimal pol­
icy, the authority may directly target domestic inflation while the nominal 
exchange rate floats freely or it may give up control over the money supply 
and target the nominal exchange rate so as to achieve indirectly the desired 
domestic inflation target.23 Independent of the exchange rate regime, a cru­
cial constraint on the optimal policy is its credibility because if it were not 
credible, the private sector would expect a different policy and it would not 
constitute an equilibrium policy. We define a policy plan to be credible when it 
is endogenously time consistent, that is, when it is ex ante and ex post optimal 
for the policy maker to follow that plan.24 In particular, an exchange rate 
system is called credible if there will be no incentive to renege on the decision 
to implement it subsequently.
3 The Optimal Tax Problem under Floating Ex­
change Rates
We first consider the optimal policy when the inflation rate is targeted and the 
nominal exchange rate floats freely. Purchasing power parity then implies that 
the nominal exchange rate is entirely determined by the differential between 
the domestic and the foreign inflation rate [compare (2)]. This scenario is 
therefore equivalent to the one in a closed economy usually analyzed by the 
public finance literature on optimal inflation rates.
3.1 The Optimal Policy under Precommitment
When the government is precommited to follow the ex ante optimal decision, 
the inherent time consistency problem does not arise by definition. Conse­
quently, the solution to the optimal tax problem does not depend on the in­
23Compare equation (2).
24Compare Kydland and Prescott (1977). By the term endogenously time consistent we 
intent to exclude the whole variety of time consistent solutions that result from imposing 




























































































formational scenario. We need to solve the authority’s optimization problem 
in this case, where a precommited policy maker chooses sequences { r f rec} and 
{^precj sQ as m;n;m;ze the expected value o f the social losses (6) subject to 
the intertemporal budget constraint (5) and to the constraint that the private 
sector expects whatever tax and inflation sequence is optimal for the precom­
mited policy maker. The first order conditions for optimality are (5) along 
with
prec _  
Tt — (H-0t prec T0 ’ (9-a)
prec
n  = (&) prec *0 ! (9-b)
7rfec =
^prec , Vf. (9-c)
In the special case in which the discount factor S equals the real interest rate 
r, constant tax rates and inflation targets are optimal in our simple set-up, 
delivering complete revenue smoothing. In general, however, optimal infla­
tion rates and optimal taxes grow (fall) with a constant factor, depending on 
whether the discount rate is larger (smaller) than the real interest rate. This 
corresponds to the intuition that a policy maker with 6 >  r  optimally collects 
more revenues in the future because the future loss is less important to him 
today. Moreover, in line with the Ramsey-principle, the optimal inflation rate 
target in any period is larger, the larger is the marginal revenue from inflation, 
a/3, relative to its marginal losses c.25
In order to find an explicit expression for 7r̂ rec, we combine the govern­
ment budget constraint and the first order conditions:
7Tprec0
[(l +  r )2 -- ( ! + « ) ] a/3
(1 +  r )2 [c +  (a/3)21
( 10)
Note that (9.c) and (10) also imply an optimal value for Tq1"60. Putting this 
expression and the first order conditions into the expression for expected social 
loss, (6), and taking expectations, we get the expected present value of social






























































































E ’ ym (zprecj =  (1 +  ^  ° ( Q)*  +  c <r£2. (11)
V '  (1 +  r )2 [c +  (a/?)2j W  V <5 )
The last term in this expression reflects the loss arising from the variability of 
the realized inflation rate around the target inflation rate due to the stochastic 
disturbances e*.
3.2 The Optimal Policy under Discretion
Since the pioneering work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978), 
it is well known in the literature that the ex ante optimal policy is time in­
consistent when the authority is not precommited, but has discretion over the 
policy instruments.27 In our set-up, this is easy to see; since /3 <  1, an unex­
pected marginal increase of the target inflation rate above the precommitment 
target generates higher marginal revenues than an expected marginal increase 
while the marginal social losses are the same. Since optimality requires that 
the marginal revenue from expected inflation under precommitment be equal 
to the marginal losses, the optimal tax mix under precommitment exhibits 
higher marginal revenues from an unexpected increase of the inflation target 
than marginal losses. The precommitment solution is thus time inconsistent 
under discretion.
Of course, rational forward looking individuals realize the potential for 
time inconsistency and thus do not base their decisions on inflation expecta­
tions given by {7rf>rec} when the authority has discretion. In a time consis­
tent equilibrium, they will instead expect a target inflation rate for which the 
marginal revenue from a surprise equals the marginal loss. As a consequence, 
the policy maker has to take this expected inflation rate o f the private sector as 
given when optimizing. Note that again it does not play an instrumental role 
whether we are in the symmetric or asymmetric informational scenario; the 
reason here is that the private sector simply chooses its expectations to ensure 
that the policy maker has no incentive to create inflation surprises regardless 
of the asymmetry of information.
26 Note that the existence of the infinite sums is ensured through condition (7).




























































































The optimal tax problem under discretion is to choose { r d,sc}  and {n f lsc} 
so as to minimize the expected value o f social loss, (6), subject to the intertem­
poral budget constraint, (5), as well as to a sequence {(irf'ac)e } o f given inflation 
expectations of the private sector. Along with (5), the first order conditions 
are now:
-d is c  _  
Tt —
( 1  +  6 '  
U  +  r ,
\ -disc 
) T0 > (12 .a)
—disc 
* t  -
/ l  +  <^ 
U  +  r ,
. t
\ —disc 






The optimal inflation rate and the expected social loss under discretion can 
as before be computed from these first order conditions and the intertemporal 
budget constraint (5):
'disc _7T0 =
E s0ym (L d,sc)  =
[(1 +  r)2 -  (1 +  £)ja^
(1 +  r)2(c +  a2/?)
[ ( l + r ) 2- ( l  + ^)]c(c + a2) 2 / I + j \
(1 +  r)2 (c +  a2/?)2 ' ' V S J
(13)
• (14)
Note that it is rational for private agents to expect {7t̂ !3C}, because at any 
time the marginal revenues MR^ex> from an unexpected increase of the inflation 
target over n f,3C equal the marginal losses M L dev as perceived by the policy 
maker:28
M R dtev =  \ta =  2 a rfiac =  2 c * f8C =  M L dtev. (15)
The policy determined above therefore is a time consistent equilibrium. Recall­
ing that /3 <  1, we furthermore observe that the inflation rate under discretion 
is larger than nyrKC in every period,
* r c <  4 iac- (i6 )
The time inconsistency of the precommitment solution hence results in the 
standard inflationary bias. Intuitively, it is clear that this inflationary bias
28Ai is the Lagrange multiplier of the optimization problem, that is, the marginal social 




























































































causes a loss of expected welfare in the discretionary equilibrium compared 
to the precommitment solution, because { t? 'sc}  and {rr ‘̂sc} were not chosen 
under precommitment although they were feasible. Formally, this follows im­
mediately from (11) and (14):
E s0ym (Lprec)  <  E 30ym (L diac) . (17)
3.3 Reputational Equilibria as a Solution to the Time Consis­
tency Problem
Having realized the welfare inferiority of the time consistent solution under 
discretion, we now show how reputational equilibria can resolve the time con­
sistency problem. For simplicity we again follow de Kock and Grilli (1993) in 
that we apply the concept of trigger strategy equilibria.29
3.3.1 Reputational Equilibria under Symmetric Information
To have a benchmark case, we need to discuss reputational equilibrium under 
symmetric information when individuals know ex post the realizations of the 
stochastic disturbance and hence the government’s inflation target. Confronted 
with a trigger strategy of the private sector, the policy maker faces a trade­
off between resisting the and giving way to the temptation of deviating from 
the inflation target that is optimal under precommitment. In order to model 
this trade-off, we assume that he starts the game with reputation and that 
in any period t he keeps his reputation when he does not deviate from the 
pre-announced inflation target. The private sector then expects 7rfrec for the 
next period.
On the contrary, if he reneges and collects the one period gains from 
an unexpected increase o f the inflation target, the authority loses its reputa­
tion forever and the private sector expects the discretionary inflation rate for 
all future periods.30 Consequently, the economy reverts from the precommit­
ment solution to the discretionary solution. Although the policy maker cannot
29See Friedman (1971) for the introduction of trigger strategies into the theory of 
oligopolies.
30 Note that finite punishment periods may well be sufficient to construct a reputational 
equilibrium. They are not considered here, because they would not add much insight but 




























































































precommit, the precommitment solution can be established as a reputational 
equilibrium as usual in this literature if the expected present value o f the social 
losses from reneging on it is larger than the expected present value o f the social 
gains. Note that if the creation of surprise inflation improves expected social 
welfare, it is optimal to collect the gains as soon as possible, because the future 
is discounted. Without loss of generality, we may therefore concentrate on the 
problem o f creating surprise inflation in period zero.
If the authority creates surprise inflation in period zero, the discretionary 
equilibrium materializes from period one on. This implies that the intertempo­
ral budget constraint (5) must be modified. In particular the revenues from the 
new optimal inflation sequence are equal to a{iVgev — 7Tgrec) +  a/3irfirec
in period zero and equal to a(3nfev in all subsequent periods. Equation (5) 
therefore changes to:
Q =  [ r t  +  <*(*$“  ~  < eC)  +  * / K reC]
o° ,
+  E  (T T T jï +  û W "  -  (7r‘ e” )e)  +  a ^ evA  > (18)
where the given inflation expectation satisfies:
(n fev)e =  4 ev Vt >  1. (19)
Note that we have implicitly assumed that the period-zero-taxes axe also reop­
timized after an inflation surprise, although it certainly takes more time in the 
real world to change taxes unexpectedly than inflation. However, since output 
taxes are collected with a one period lag, the policy maker may well be able to 
change the tax rate of period zero.
The sequence of tax and inflation rates, { r f ev}  and { tv* ” } , that min­
imizes expected social loss (6) subject to the modified intertemporal budget 
constraint (18) and the modified sequence (jVgrec)e, (n f,3C)e, (vr̂ 130)6, . . .  o f infla­































































































Vi. (20.c)„d ev  _ (i —dev* t  =  ~ Tt )c
It should be stressed that although these first order conditions may at first 
sight appear to be the same as under discretion, the intertemporal budget con­
straint (18) is different from (5), leading to different optimal tax and inflation 
sequences. For a reputational equilibrium to exist, the expected social loss after 
a deviation from the precommitment solution, Egym (Ldev), must not be smaller 
than the expected social loss without a deviation, E 3Qym{Lrep). Realizing that 
under symmetric information E lyrn(Lrep) — Eq*171 (Lprec), the condition for the 
existence o f a reputational equilibrium may be written as:
E sym (LPrec^  <  £ sym ^ d e v 'j  _ ( 2 1 )
It is not straightforward to solve this condition explicitly.31 However, it can 
be shown that there are parameter values for which a reputational equilibrium 
exists, while it does not for others. Appendix A contains the technical details 
o f this argument as well as the explicit characterization of the optimal surprise 
inflation rate and the expected social loss after a surprise, given the policy 
maker reneges. Notice that for the present purpose it is sufficient to know that 
an equilibrium under symmetric information sometimes does and sometimes 
does not exit, because we are mainly interested in understanding the differences 
between the equilibria under symmetric and under asymmetric information 
rather than the equilibrium under symmetric information itself.
3.3.2 Reputational Equilibria under Asymmetric Information
In contrast to the precommitment and the discretionary paradigm, the exis­
tence and the properties of a reputational equilibrium are affected by asym­
metric information. This comes about because private agents cannot tell with 
certainty anymore whether the authority has deliberately deviated from the 
precommitment solution or whether the deviation of lit from 7TQrec is due to 
an unexpected disturbance. As Canzoneri (1985) argued, publishing private
31 The problem appears to be that we deal with a dynamic because government bonds are 
present in our model. In contrast, de Kock and Grilli (1993) can solve their equilibrium 
condition since they exclude bonds from the analysis by assumption, implying that there is 
no intertemporal tax smoothing anymore and consequently that their game is repeated in 





























































































information would not solve this problem, because the policy maker had an 
incentive to misrepresent its inflation target in order to hide reneging on the 
precommitment solution. However, it may still be possible to establish the 
precommitment solution as a reputational equilibrium under discretion. Fol­
lowing Canzoneri (1985), the private sector may choose a trigger value T  and 
revert to the discretionary equilibrium if the difference between 11* and nt be­
comes larger than T. In order to derive an existence condition of a reputational 
equilibrium for any given T , we need to determine the expected social losses 
depending on whether the authority creates surprise inflation or not. We will 
then discuss how the optimal T  is chosen. As before, we restrict the analysis 
to the creation of surprise inflation in period zero.
1. The optimal policy when no inflation surprise is created in period 
zero:
The probability prep (T ) that the policy maker loses his reputation in any 
period t conditional on that the economy was in the reputational equilibrium 
in period t — 1 equals the probability that 11* — Trt > T . Since n* — 7r* =  e* and 
e< is i.i.d., we may express prep (T ) as:
OC
Prep(T ) =  J  f ( e 0)de0, (22)
r
where / ( . )  denotes the density of e. It is important to realize that if the au­
thority has not reneged, but n* — 7r* >  T , it will not lose its reputation forever. 
This comes about because no additional revenues have been collected through 
surprise inflation, implying that all future optimal tax and inflation rates re­
main unchanged. In contrast, if surprise inflation were created, additional 
revenues would be collected that could not be hoarded ad infinitum. To keep 
matters as simple as possible, the creation of an inflation surprise is assumed 
to become obvious when the tax proceeds are collected in the next period.32 
Consequently, the discretionary outcome will materialize for only one period 
when the policy maker loses his reputation erroneously.
The probability Pt{T) that the economy erroneously is in the discre­
tionary equilibrium in period t equals the probability with which the policy
32We may justify this assumption by the fact that most real world central banks are re­





























































































maker loses his reputation in period t — 1 conditional on the fact that he had 
full reputation in that period:
Po(T) =  0, pt( T ) = p rep( T ) [ l - p t_ i(T )] (t =  l , 2 , . . .  )• (23)
Similarly, the probability that the precommitment solution is the outcome in 
period t is equal to the probability of the discretionary outcome in the last 
period, pt~i (T ) , plus the probability that the policy maker has reputation in 
period t conditional on that he had reputation in the period before:
[l -P t (T ) ]  =  P i- i (T ) +  [l - p rep(T )j [ l - Pt - i (T ) ] .  (24)
Under asymmetric information, the expected social loss when the authority 
never reneges can therefore be expressed as:33
E r m( L ^ ( T ) )  =  £  [ ( i - Pt( T j ) E * r { L r c)
+P t{T )E süym(L dr ) \ , (25)
where Lptrec and Ldtsc denote the expected period t social losses under precom­
mitment and under discretion in period t. Note that (25) can be rewritten 
to
E asym ^ r e p ^  _  ^ d i s c )  _  g  1 .Z g g ?  f f i " »  -  L f  eC)
=  E ° r  ( i prej + p  ( L? ac -  Ltrec)  ■ (26)
Hence, when a reputational equilibrium under asymmetric information exists 
it will have poorer welfare properties than a reputational equilibrium under 
symmetric information. However, it still welfare-dominates the discretionary 
equilibrium:
Egym (L rep)  =  £ oym( l prec)
<  E r m(L repm )
33The infinite sums in the following expressions exist because pt{T) and (1 — pt(T)) are 





























































































<  E ‘Qym(L di,c)  =  £ " sm ( V isc) . (27)
The expected welfare loss from asymmetric information when a reputational 
equilibrium exists reflects the inflationary bias, arising because, even though 
it is optimal for the policy maker not to create surprise inflation, the econ­
omy reverts to the discretionary equilibrium with a positive probability in any 
period.
2. The optimal policy after surprise inflation has been created in 
period zero:
To derive the probabilities with which the policy maker loses its reputation after 
an inflation surprise in period zero, we recall that he certainly loses reputation 
in period one when the tax proceeds of period zero are collected. This implies 
that with probability one the discretionary outcome materializes from period 
two onwards. In contrast, the outcome in period one depends on the realization 
of the eo- disturbance. On the one hand, if eo +  (~oev ~  >  T , the private
sector spots the inflation surprise already in period zero and the discretionary 
outcome materializes in period one. This happens with probability
OC
pdev(T ) =  j  / ( e o ) *  0- (28)
i r - ( « j " - « r e)]
On the other hand, if eo +  (»rgev — rrgrec) <  T , the policy maker will still 
have reputation in period one despite the fact that he has reneged in period 
zero. The probability of this alternative is (1 — pdev{T )). The optimal tax 
and inflation sequences in these two cases are characterized in an Appendix B. 
As before they may be expressed as functions of the rate of surprise inflation 
in period zero, ngev. Consequently, the expected social losses may also be 
expressed as functions of 7Tgev:
Eg3ym (L dev{ 4 e\T)\e0 < T -  (7rdev -  7rprec))
c[(l +  r)2 -  (1 + J)]
E^tym[L dtv{ ^ ev, r ) |e0 >  T  -  (rrdev -  nyrec))
( M 4 ev) f  +  c ( 4 ev) 2 +  (c +  “ 2)(1 +  s)
c ( 1 + r ) (1 +  *)]
( r o K ^ ) ) 2, (29)




























































































3. Characterization of the optimal rate of surprise inflation:
Applying (29) and (30), we can now determine the optimal jrdev under asym­
metric information. It has to minimize the following version of the present 
value of expected future social loss:34
E asym ^ d e v ^ d e v ^
=  ( l  -  pdev(T)^EgSym [L dev( 4 ev,T)\e0 < T -  (ndev -  7rPrec)) 
+ pdev(T )E a0sym(L dev( 4 ev,T)\e0 > T - ( n dev -  irprec) ) .  (31)
The optimal njjev is characterized by the first order condition:
dpdev(T )
dn$ev
E^ym^Ldev{ 4 ev,T )  |e0 > T - ( n dev -  7rprec))
—EgSym [Ldev( 4 ev,T)\e0 < T -  (ndev -  7rprec))
=  - ( l - p deV( T ) ) ^ ; E a0ayrn(Ldev(nt,r)\e0 < T - ( n dev -  7TP~C)) 
- P deV(T ) Q ^ Z EoSym [L dev{ 4 cv)\^ > T - ( n dev- n ”recj ) . (32)
Provided that the policy maker reneges under asymmetric information, op­
timality requires the surprise inflation rate to equate the marginal expected 
increase of social loss from a marginal increase o f surprise inflation [lhs of (32)] 
with the marginal expected decrease of social loss [rhs of (32)]. More precisely, 
the marginal expected increase of social loss is equal to the marginal increase 
of the probability that the economy reverts to the discretionary equilibrium, 
dpdev{T )/ d 4 ev, times the resulting expected social loss; the marginal social 
gain from Em unexpected increase of inflation equals the resulting expected 
reduction of social loss if pdev{T ) remained unchanged.
Although we have not explicitly characterized the optimal deviation rate 
under asymmetric information, we can compare the expected social losses after 
surprise inflation under symmetric and under asymmetric information. To do 
this, imagine which expected social loss would arise under asymmetric informa-
34 Notice that since we actually determine the optimal rate of surprise inflation, sticking to 
the precommitment solution will be a global optimum provided a reputational equilibrium ex­
ists. In contrast, Canzoneri (1985) only discussed marginal inflation surprises. Consequently, 




























































































tion if the tax and inflation policy optimal under symmetric information was 
implemented. Since with a positive probability, the collected revenues from 
inflation for this policy are larger under asymmetric than under symmetric in­
formation, there would also be a positive probability o f tax and inflation cuts. 
Under asymmetric information, the expected social loss from this policy would 
thus be smaller than the expected loss from the same policy under symmet­
ric information. Since the policy optimal under symmetric information is in 
general not the optimal one under asymmetric information, we conclude that
E asym ( j d t v  ̂  < £ sym ^ d e v ^  (33)
4. The relation between the equilibrium conditions under symmetric 
and asymmetric information:
A reputational equilibrium under asymmetric information now exists, if there 
exists a trigger value T  such that the expected social loss after an inflation 
surprise in period zero is not smaller than the expected social loss without 
surprise inflation:
E asym ( Lrep-j <  £ asÿm ^d ev(.7-^ _ (34)
Since the left hand side of this condition is increasing in T , the minimal trigger 
value for which (34) is fulfilled will guarantee the existence o f a reputational 
equilibrium while minimizing the inflationary bias from asymmetric informa­
tion. In order to study the relation between the existence conditions of a 
reputational equilibrium under symmetric and under asymmetric information, 
we observe that (27) together with (33) implies
E asym  ̂Ldev _  ep̂  <  ^dev  _  jjrep^ _ (35)
Since for a reputational equilibrium to exist the expected difference Ldev — Lrep 
must not be negative, the existence o f a reputational equilibrium under asym­
metric information implies the existence under symmetric information, but not 
vice versa. Moreover, as has been shown in the previous section, a reputational 
equilibrium under symmetric information does not always exist. From inequal­
ity (35) and the continuity of the expected social loss functions, it therefore 
follows that there must exist parameter constellations, for which a reputational 
equilibrium only exists under symmetric information. Summarizing, there are 




























































































1. A reputational equilibrium exists under both symmetric and asymmetric 
information.
2. A reputational equilibrium exists under symmetric but not under asym­
metric infomation.
3. A reputational equilibrium does not exit under either symmetric or under 
asymmetric information.
The previous results allow us to express explicitly the expected loss o f social 
welfare as a consequence of the inflationary bias from asymmetric information 
in all o f these cases. In case 1., the expected social loss equals:
oo
1% sym ( l rep) -  E ’ ym ( i rep) =  T r ~ v t E lym { l ? sc -  Lprec)  >  o. (36)
Moreover, in case 2., the expected welfare loss resulting from asymmetric infor­
mation is even larger, amounting to E sQyrn(Ldlac — Lprec). Finally and trivially, 
in case 3., no expected loss of social welfare results from asymmetric informa­
tion.
In the following section, we will discuss under what circumstances the 
welfare loss due to asymmetric ̂ form ation  can be eliminated through the 
implementation of a pegged nominal exchange rate system.
4 The Optimal Tax Problem under Pegged Ex­
change Rates
When the authority implements an exchange rate peg, it must give up control 
over the domestic money supply. Purchasing power parity then implies that 
the domestic inflation rate is endogenously determined by the rate o f nominal 
exchange rate depreciation e< and the foreign inflation rate II’ .35 In the special 
case of an exchange rate peg, the rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation is 
zero and the domestic inflation rate is equal to the foreign one. As in (8), the 
foreign inflation rate is assumed to be equal to the sum of the foreign inflation 
target and a foreign i.i.d. disturbance e*t :
n? = »? + *?. (37)




























































































Moreover, e*t is again supposed to have zero mean and a finite variance a*2. 
Substituting expression (37) into (2), we find:
Ilf =  (tt* +  f*t ) +  (38)
If the crawling peg is credible, equation (38) implies that the rational inflation 
expectation of the private sector is equal to the (credible) foreign inflation 
target plus the rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation:36
n? = <  + (39)
For any given foreign inflation rate target, there thus exists a unique rate of 
nominal exchange rate depreciation, êt(nt,n*) — nt — ir ,̂ which yields the 
desired domestic inflation rate target 7q in expected terms.
4.1 Exchange Rate Pegging under Symmetric Information
Under symmetric information, the only difference between implementing the 
crawling peg {et(nt, tt*)} and targeting the equivalent inflation rate { 7r( } is the 
precision with which the target can be achieved. Independently of whether 
the economy is in the precommitment, the discretionary, or the reputational 
equilibrium, the difference between the expected social loss under inflation 
targeting compared to the crawling peg {e<} is equal to:
E lym (l/(inf. targ.) -  L(craw. peg)) =  (<*e “  ■ (40)
Equation (40) shows that the properly designed crawling peg improves expected 
social welfare under symmetric information, if the foreign inflation rate can 
be controlled more precisely than the domestic one, which may not be an 
implausible situation. The reason lies in the fact that on the one hand the 
optimal foreign inflation rate is presumably lower than the domestic one if 
the foreign central bank is independent and aims for price stability while the 
dependent domestic central bank determines inflation according to the previous 
optimal taxation considerations.37 On the other hand, the variance of inflation
36 Recall that the foreign inflation target was assumed to be credible because of the inde­
pendence of foreign central bank. The expectation of this target is thus equal to the target.
37Compare (10). If the relative social loss of inflation c is not “much larger than one” , 




























































































may well be related positively to the level of inflation.38
It should be stressed that if the domestic authority could control the 
inflation rate as precisely as the foreign one, then implementing {e<(7q,7rt*)} 
would be completely equivalent to targeting 7q under symmetric information. 
Moreover, an exchange rate peg with a fixed parity [e< =  0] would then de­
crease expected social welfare, because it would result in the foreign inflation 
rate instead of the domestically optimal inflation rate. In particular, this would 
hold true in the absence of uncertainty when both, the domestic and the for­
eign country can precisely control their inflation rates. This result indicates 
the problem with the monetary policy game literature on exchange pegs as 
disinflation devices, which was addressed above: within the standard, highly 
stylized models without uncertainty, it is logically inconsistent to assume wel­
fare gains from exchange rate pegging compared to inflation targeting. 39 We 
now argue that this inconsistency may be removed through the introduction of 
asymmetric information. To show this, we concentrate on situations in which 
the precommitment solution can be implemented as a reputational equilib­
rium under symmetric information; otherwise there is no difference between 
the symmetric and the asymmetric information scenario.
4.2 Credible Purchases of Credibility under Asymmetric In­
formation
4.2.1 A  Crawling Peg
Since we have restricted attention to the case in which the foreign country does 
not experience an inflationary bias at all, the crawling peg {e<(7rt, 7q*)} achieves 
the domestic inflation target {7r(} in expected terms. Deviations from the tar­
get that are not caused by verifiable foreign shocks are thus only possible if the 
domestic policy maker creates surprise inflation. Consequently, the situation 
is identical to inflation targeting under symmetric information and the policy
This appears to have been the relevant case for the participants of the EMS that experienced 
a major disinflation process. Higher collection cost of output and excise taxes are usually 
taken as the reason for a low weight of the social losses from inflation in the expected social 
loss function; compare Canzoneri and Rogers (1990). The same argument certainly applies 
to many other inflation prone countries.
38 See Taylor (1983) for empirical evidence and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) for a the­
oretical justification.





























































































maker only loses his reputation if he actually deviates from the targeted nomi­
nal exchange rate. In particular, the domestic precommitment outcome {wfrec} 
can be implemented through the crawling peg {ê*(7rfrec, 7r*)}  as a reputational 
equilibrium under asymmetric information whenever it can be implemented 
as a reputational equilibrium through inflation targeting under symmetric in­
formation. The implementation of a crawling peg then is endogenously time 
consistent and credible. Note that this is true despite the fact that there are 
parameter constellations in which targeting {7T̂ >rec} under asymmetric infor­
mation is not credible. This is the sense in which the domestic authority can 
“credibly purchase credibility through exchange rate pegging” .
Given that a reputational equilibrium exists under symmetric informa­
tion, the expected welfare gains from the implementation of the crawling peg 
{é((7rfrec, 7T*)}  compared to targeting the domestic precommitment inflation 
rate axe twofold. First, the imported higher precision with which the foreign 
authority can presumably control inflation results in a reduction o f the vari­
ance o f domestic inflation. Second, the elimination of the inflationary bias due 
to asymmetric information improves expected social welfare. The magnitude 
of the latter effect depends on whether a reputational equilibrium exists under 
asymmetric information:
1. Expected social welfare gain when a reputational equilibrium exists under 
asymmetric information [case 1. above]:
OO
E asym targ.) -  L(craw. peg)) = ]T  ^ ^ t E s0ym ( l [ ,sc -  i f ec)
( i i >
2. Expected social welfare gain when a reputational equilibrium does not exist 
under asymmetric information [case 2. above]:
E laym ( i ( in f. targ.) — i(craw . peg)) =  £ ’gSm — i j rec)
+ ( ~ r )  (*?—*?■)• («)
These expressions show the extent to which the “credible purchase of credi­





























































































4.2.2 An Exchange Rate Peg with a Fixed Parity
When a fixed peg is implemented, the rate o f nominal exchange rate depreci­
ation is zero and the domestic country imports the suboptimally low foreign 
inflation rate. Given that a reputational equilibrium exists under symmetric 
information, the expected welfare gain from pegging the nominal exchange rate 
to the foreign currency under asymmetric information is equal to:
E^'vm{L(inî. taxg.) — £ (peg)) =  f?QSÿm ^L(inf. targ.) — L(craw. peg))
- E l ’ ym (h (peg) -  L(craw. p eg )), (43)
where:
E r m{L (craw, peg)) =  E°ym { i f " ' )  ,
OO -,
K ym { L M )  = E  (T r  + aP<) > E r  (LPreC)
and { TfCg} is the sequence of tax rates that minimizes expected social loss when 
the foreign inflation rates { r f } are imported. From the first order conditions 
for optimality, { r f e9} can entirely be characterized by:
peg _  (1 +  r)2 ~  (1 +  <S)
0 (1 +  r )2 5 - a / ? E^ ( 1 +  r)<
(44.a) 
(44.b)
We see that the expected reduction of social loss from the implementation o f a 
pegged exchange rate system with a fixed parity is smaller than the expected 
reduction o f social loss from a properly designed crawling peg when the foreign 
country has an optimal tax mix different from the domestic country. If the 
expected welfare loss from the adoption of the suboptimal foreign tax mix is 
smaller than the expected welfare gain from the elimination of the inflation­
ary bias as a consequence of asymmetric information, a fixed peg can still be 
implemented as a reputational equilibrium. In this case the nominal exchange 
rate peg is endogenously time consistent and therefore credible. In the opposite 
case, a fixed peg rate system can even result in higher expected social losses 
than a floating rate system and is thus not credible.




























































































a fixed parity is credible, it in general has poorer welfare properties than a 
properly designed crawling peg within our model. This result confirms Dorn- 
busch’s (1988) recommendation that countries with radically different optimal 
tax structures should not implement a nominal exchange rate peg with a fixed 
parity but should rather adopt the crawling peg that properly accounts for the 
domestic public finance situation.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, the time consistency problem of monetary policy has been stud­
ied within a simple open economy model of optimal taxation, in which inflation 
is affected by stochastic disturbances, implying imperfect control over the infla­
tion rate by the policy maker. In the realistic asymmetric information scenario, 
the realizations of the stochastic disturbances to the inflation rate are private 
information of the policy maker. An inflationary bias then arises in a repu­
tational equilibrium when the inflation rate is targeted. It has been shown 
that the resulting expected welfare loss from asymmetric information can be 
eliminated through the implementation of a crawling nominal exchange rate 
peg vis-a-vis a foreign country’s currency, provided that the foreign authority 
has access to a precommitment technology and that a reputational equilib­
rium under symmetric information exist. In this case, the implementation of 
the precommitment outcome through the properly designed crawling peg is an 
endogenously time consistent reputational equilibrium under asymmetric in­
formation and the domestic country can “credibly purchase credibility” from 
the precommited foreign authority.
In addition, if the optimal tax mixes do not differ by too much between 
the two countries and if a reputational equilibrium exists under symmetric 
information, a nominal exchange rate peg with a fixed parity has also been 
shown to be implementable as a reputational equilibrium under asymmetric 
information. For this to hold true, the induced expected welfare losses from 
accepting the domestically suboptimal foreign tax mix must be overcompen­
sated by the expected welfare gain through the elimination of the inflation bias 
due to asymmetric information. A nominal exchange rate peg then is credible. 
However, while it is welfare superior to targeting the domestic inflation rate 
in this case, it generally has poorer welfare properties than the crawling peg 




























































































importing the foreign inflation rate.
It should be stressed that the difference between symmetric and asym­
metric information may endogenously lead to the scenario that has frequently 
been assumed in the literature on the EMS, notably that although inflation 
targeting is not credible (resulting in the discretionary equilibrium), pegging 
the nominal exchange rate to a foreign currency that is governed by a pre- 
commited policy maker is credible. It is in this sense that the present paper 
extents the existing literature and in particular the recent analysis of de Kock 
and Grill! (1993).
The results of this paper appear to be of relevance beyond the discus­
sion o f the recent EMS-experience. For instance, the “purchase o f credibility” 
may be one explanation for why many countries in central America or why 
Austria and the northern neighbors of the European community have found it 
advantageous to peg their nominal exchange rate unilaterally to the U.S. dol­
lar or an EMS currency, respectively.40 The choice of an appropriate exchange 
rate regime is also likely to become an important issue for Mexico and for the 
Eastern European countries. According to the results found above, a fixed 
pegged nominal exchange rate system is not likely to improve expected welfare 
for these countries, since they are obviously heavily dependent on seigniorage 
revenues.41 Consequently the optimal inflation rates for these countries are 
higher than the ones in the countries they will possibly peg their nominal ex­
change rate to (Germany or the U.S.A.). A crawling peg would therefore seem 
to be the right regime to implement in order to import credibility. O f course 
necessary prerequisites are that central banks build up a stock o f international 
reserves sufficient to defend the crawling peg and that disciplined fiscal poli­
cies, which are consistent with the crawling peg, are followed. In addition 
to eliminating the inflationary bias from asymmetric information, another ex­
pected welfare gain is then likely to accrue from a crawling peg, because the 
central banks in Germany or the U.S.A. can presumably control the inflation 
rate much more accurately.42
Finally two limitations o f the analysis carried out above should be men­
40 In the latter case, this choice has certainly been motivated by the interest in joining the 
EU too.
41 Compare Ortiz (1991) and Oblath and Valentinyi (1994), respectively.
42For a discussion of other issues related to the choice of the exchange rate systems in this 





























































































tioned. First, there axe clear problems applying the concept o f trigger strate­
gies, which was suggested by Friedman (1971) in oligopoly theory, to monetary 
policy games. Most importantly, trigger strategies are not unique and hence 
there is no unique equilibrium; consequently it is not clear how the atomistic 
private sector can coordinate on any particular equilibrium.43 Second, in or­
der to maintain analytical tractability, the analysis has only focused on the 
credibility effects of the exchange rate regime. Of course other aspects as well 
are likely to affect expected social welfare:44 On the one hand, the presumably 
negative effects of exchange rate uncertainty on international trade and in­
vestment would support the case for the implementation of a credible nominal 
exchange rate peg. On the other hand, under a pegged exchange rate system 
it is impossible to accommodate terms of trade shocks that hit the domestic 
country only, yielding a loss of expected welfare.45 Modeling these effects on 
social welfare is beyond the scope of the present paper, but they should be 
kept in mind as important qualifications o f the results derived here.
Appendix A
In this appendix, we characterize the optimal policy and determine the ex­
pected social loss under symmetric information, provided the government de­
viates from the precommitment solution. To do this, we substitute the first 
order conditions for { r f ev} and {^ fev} into (18), which delivers an expression
43Note that recently al Nowaihi and Levine (1994) showed how at least the length of 
the punishment period can be derived endogenously. In Herrendorf (1994a), I take up this 
idea in Canzoneri’s (1985) version of the Barro-Gordon-type framework and discuss similar 
issues as in the present paper. Moreover, in Herrendorf (1994b) I show that the idea of 
the present paper carries over to a Cukierman-Meltzer-type monetary policy model with 
asymmetric information about a stochastic component of the government’s objective, which 
reflects political instability [Cukierman and Meltzer (1986a,1986b)]. Even though the foreign 
policy maker has discretion in this model, credibility can be purchased through a crawling peg 
when the foreign country is politically more stable. This result suggests that the informational 
advantage of pegged exchange rate systems under asymmetric information should apply to 
fairly general situations, provided the policy maker finds it in his favor to minimize the 
ambiguity about his type or his actions.
“ Compare the literature on common currency areas. Masson and Taylor (1992) provide a 
recent review.




























































































for 7Tgev in terms of the exogenous parameters and of Tfgrec:
a  f(l +  r )2 — (1 +  <5)1 , ,
(c +  q 2)(1 +  r )2 -  q 2( l  -  /3)( 1 +  5) lG +  “ (1 "  ‘ (A-1)
Using the first order conditions and (A .l), explicit expressions for all elements 
from {T fev} and {^ fev}  can be derived. The expected social loss when the 
policy maker deviates can then be expressed as a function o f ffgev,
Egym(Ldev) =
c(c +  q 2) ( l  +  r )2 
q 2 [(l +  r )2 - ( l - M ) ]
(A.2)
Similarly, the expected loss under precommitment, (11) can be expressed in 
terms of 7rgrec,
, . c\c +  (a/3)2] (1 +  r )2
E sym  /L prec\ =  _L---)---LLi----- ’
y ’  o»[(l +  r ) * - ( !  +  !)]
Using (A.2) and (A.3), the condition for the existence of a reputational equi­
librium under symmetric information, (21), can be rewritten to:
0 <
c ( l + r ) 2
> [(l+ r )2 - ( 1 + 8 ) ]
( c + a 2 ĵ -  (c+ (a /3 )2)  ( - o _ V • (A.4)
For any given set o f parameter values this condition is straightforward to check. 
However, it is not obvious to derive an explicit general condition from (A.4) 
because, as is straightforward to check, (7) implies that 7Tgev is always smaller 
than rrr°//3. We will therefore only show that for some parameter values a 
reputational equilibrium does exist whereas it does not for others.
To see this, consider the case when f3 approaches zero. From (10) it 
immediately follows that -Kgrec =  0. Using this and (A .l), condition
(A.4) can in the limit be written as:
q [ ( l + r ) 2 —(!+<?)]
2
c ( l + r ) 2
<  (c+ q 2)
q [ ( l + r ) 2 — (1+5)} 






























































































which is equivalent to:46
a 2 J[(1 +  r )2 - ( ! + * ) ] f
(1 +  r ) 2 |2(1 +  (5) — (1 + r )2]
(A-6)
In the limit, (A.4) is therefore violated for all c that violate (A .6). By the 
continuity of E^ym(Ldev — Lprec), we conclude that there must exist a 0 -  
neighborhood of zero, in which a reputational equilibrium does not exist, pro­
vided c does not satisfy (A .6). This is plausible because if 0  «  0, the marginal 
revenues from anticipated inflation are negligible and the difference between 
the revenues from anticipated and unanticipated inflation is maximal, giving 
the authority the maximal incentive to collect revenues from surprise inflation. 
It will do so when the marginal cost c from surprise inflation are not too large 
compared to the marginal revenue a. In contrast, if c is large relative to a , that 
is, if c satisfies (A .6), the creation of surprise inflation is not welfare improv­
ing. There then must exist a neighborhood of zero such that a reputational 
equilibrium exists for 0  being from that neighborhood.47
Appendix B
In this appendix, the optimal tax and inflation rates for a given ndev are de­
termined, depending on whether, after an inflation surprise, the policy maker 
loses his reputation in period zero or in period one.
i) Reputation is lost in period zero:
In this case, the optimal policy for any given Tidev has to minimize
( * " ) ’ + 1  (t t? ) ' + <B1>
subject to:
46Note that the additional but innocuous assumption 2(1 +  6) >  (1 +  r)2 is necessary to 
show this.
47It may be observed that independent of the other parameters, a reputational equilibrium 




























































































(B.2)ç ( 4 ev) ~ s - * ( 4 ev - < rec) - <*/Mrec
00 /  1 \ <
+E  (1^7J [ftdev+« («f” - (4 evr ) + a p ^ r r },
where the given inflation expectation ( s fe” )e is equal to n f'” Vt >  2. 
Using the first order conditions for optimality, the solution to this prob­
lem can for any given 7TQetJ completely be characterized by the following 












ii) Reputation is lost in period one:
The optimal policy for any given TTgev then has to minimize
+ £  (rÿj)' + <B-7>
subject to:
s ( 4 ev) =  s -  o ( 4 ev -  < ec) -  « K rec (b .8)
00 /  1 \ t
= 4 ev+E  (177;) lf?ev+a f t ev -  (*?“ )') + <*p(4 er \ ,
where the given inflation expectation (nfev)e is equal to irfev Vt >  1. In 




























































































is characterized by the expressions (t =  1 ,2 , . . . ) :
(B.12)
(B.10)
(B. l l )
(B.9)
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